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Crime and Unequal Punishment: Proving Racial
Intent in Felony Disenfranchisement
Abel Huskinson1 and Kaitlyn Long2

I. Introduction
Marion Scraggs is a 57-year-old former felon who started using drugs
after high school.3 She served her sentence in jail, and, while she was
incarcerated, her son was murdered. Upon her release, Marion went
to school and got a master’s degree specializing in addiction, and
she now works as a supervisor for the housekeeping division of a
luxury hotel. Marion has not touched drugs since her conviction. She
changed her life. She is the model for rehabilitation. She is entirely
out of the criminal justice system and is a fully functioning citizen,
except for one thing: she is not allowed to vote.4
Felony disenfranchisement, or barring convicted felons from
voting, is a punishment used in almost every state. Although states
1
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differ in their severity of felony disenfranchisement, these laws
resulted in 5.1 million Americans being unable to participate in the
2020 national election.5 The United States Supreme Court ruled in
Richardson v. Ramirez that the language of the 14th Amendment,
specifically the condition of “participation in rebellion or other
crime,” offers a clear legal path for felony disenfranchisement to
exist outside of legal contentions, such as the 14th Amendment’s
equal protection clause.6 The Court later found in Hunter v. Underwood that felony disenfranchisement would violate the equal protection clause if it contained “both [an] impermissible racial motivation
and racially discriminatory impact.”7 Recent scholarship has found
felony disenfranchisement to disproportionately affect marginalized racial groups.8 As such, it becomes the burden of felony disenfranchisement constitutional challenges to prove racial intent,
a process that has been markedly difficult. This paper argues that
felony disenfranchisement’s constitutionality should be determined using a more comprehensive racial intent qualification that
accounts for not only explicit intent, but also an expanded definition of intent: lethargic intent.
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II. Background
A. Disenfranchisement History
The United States derived the concept of disenfranchisement from its
colonial history, specifically the medieval principle of “civil death”.9
Given to the equivalents of felony offenders, civil death described a
state in which an individual forfeited all legal protections, even those
pertaining to murder.10 English law maintained this ideal with strict
punishments for felony-level offenders, “which resulted in forfeiture
of all property, inability to inherit or devise property, and loss of
all civil rights”.11 The British colonies in the Americas were influenced by this heritage in 1792 when Kentucky began the trend of
legislatures writing felony disenfranchisement provisions into their
respective state constitutions.12 Following 1792, twenty-four out of
thirty-three states wrote felony disenfranchisement provisions into
their constitutions.13
Following the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870,
a large portion of the U.S. had a newfound interest in finding ways
to disenfranchise Black voters.14 In addition to overtly punitive and
Black-targeting black codes, felony disenfranchisement’s expansion following the Fifteenth Amendment allowed states to erase
9
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Black political power.15 These felony disenfranchisement provisions
remain in several states and continue to systematically and disproportionately affect the Black population and have been repeatedly
documented. For instance, today, “one in 16 African Americans of
voting age is disenfranchised, a rate 3.7 times greater than that of
non-African Americans.”16
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Crime and Unequal Punishment:
Proving Racial Intent in Felony Disenfranchisement

39

As shown in Table 1, felony disenfranchisement differs significantly
by state. Felons are re-enfranchised at different points in their sentences. A few rare states never disenfranchise felons, while most reenfranchise felons at either parole or probation. A fair number never
restore voting rights or only restore them after special requirements
are met, such as after the felons pay a fee or receive the governor’s
permission. The 5.1 million Americans disenfranchised by these
laws are not evenly distributed.17 For example, “in seven states—
Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wyoming—more than one in seven African Americans is disenfranchised, twice the national average for African Americans.”18
B. Felony Disenfranchisement in Court
The first case in which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement was Richardson v. Ramirez
in 1974. In this case, three individuals who had previously been
convicted of felonies and completed their sentences and parole were
denied voter registration in California.19 The case was brought to
the California Supreme Court under the argument that it violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The
Court agreed, stating that California’s disenfranchisement of exfelons could not pass strict scrutiny. However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court’s decision on
the grounds that the disenfranchisement of felons was not to be held
17

Christina Maxouris, More than 5 million people with felony convictions
can’t vote in this year’s election, advocacy group finds, Cable News
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felony-convictions-voting-sentencing-project-study/index.html.
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to the same standards as other voting rights cases.21 The majority
opinion held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly makes an exception for denying the right to vote “for participation in rebellion, or other crime”,22 and since this language remained
unaltered throughout much debate on the syntax of the Amendment,
those who wrote it clearly intended for states to be able to disenfranchise felons.23 Thus, the Court determined that felony disenfranchisement need not be held under strict scrutiny and allowed these
laws to continue.
Only months after Richardson, in Thiess v. State Administrative
Board of Election Laws, the District Court of Maryland found that
Maryland’s felony disenfranchisement law was not unconstitutional.24 Although the law was not overturned, it did leave open the possibility for disenfranchisement laws to be ruled unconstitutional if
they were arbitrarily enforced. Selective enforcement was examined
once again in Williams v. Taylor, in which the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals also decided that an otherwise constitutional disenfranchisement law could be ruled unconstitutional in the case of selective
enforcement.25 Even without overturning felony disenfranchisement
laws, these cases illustrated that there is a path for determining these
laws unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement was examined once again by the Supreme Court with Hunter v. Underwood in
1985.26 In this case, Alabama’s felony disenfranchisement laws were
challenged after two men were convicted of presenting a worthless
check and lost the right to vote under a new provision to the Alabama
Constitution allowing for disenfranchisement after crime of any
kind. Plaintiffs challenged this disenfranchisement under the Equal
21

Richardson, 418 U.S. 24 at 25.
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U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 2.
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Richardson, 418 U.S. 24 at 45.
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Protection Clause, arguing that its purpose was discriminatory.27 The
District Court ruled that the law was constitutional because although
it did have discriminatory effects, it could not be proven to have racist intent.28 However, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
decision on the grounds that the defendants could not prove that the
outcome was not dependent on having a discriminatory purpose.29
The Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court’s decision that the provision did violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court argued
that since the law was facially neutral with racially disproportionate effects, its constitutionality depended on whether the law was
passed with a discriminatory purpose.30 Using statements by those
who adopted this provision that advocate for white supremacy in
Alabama, the Court showed that the purpose of the law was discriminatory.31 This case established that for a felony disenfranchisement
to be ruled unconstitutional, it must have “both [an] impermissible
racial motivation and racially discriminatory impact”.32
The impact portion specified in Hunter v. Underwood has been
shown through decades of modern scholarship. The impact is not
only limited to individual voting rights loss; the effects of felony
disenfranchisement are correlated with other social contentions. For
instance, studies have shown that felony disenfranchisement also
reduces turnout amongst those eligible to vote, hurting not only felony offenders, but the community at large.33 The racial impact of felony disenfranchisement is not a matter of debate; the overwhelming
scholarly consensus rules in favor of impermissible racial impact on
27

Id.
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all accounts.34 Although the racist impacts of felony disenfranchisement have been proven through scholarship, the question of what
constitutes racial intent is left unanswered.
C. The Development of Discriminatory Intent
Before discriminatory intent became a necessity for determining
constitutionality, racially disparate impacts were more often considered as enough to overturn a law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins established
that facially neutral laws can still be unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.35 In this case, a law regulating laundries
in wooden buildings was implemented so that it gave permits to virtually all white applicants and no Chinese applicants; additionally,
Chinese applicants who did not comply were arrested, while comparable white applicants were not. The Supreme Court ruled this
regulation unconstitutional based on these effects.36 Thus, this case
established that racially disparate impacts, even in light of facially
neutral laws, can demonstrate the constitutionality of a law under the
Equal Protection Clause. Although intent was not used to determine
the ruling, it became clear that such obvious racial impacts demonstrated racially discriminatory intent to some extent. If the racial
impacts were so obvious, the legislative body clearly meant for these
impacts to occur.
The importance of considering racial impacts was further established in later cases, such as the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown
v. Board of Education. This case was largely based on the effects
that segregated schooling would have on children, such as a feeling
34

E.g., Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza, Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 American
Journal of Sociology 559, 559 (2003); Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes behind
Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 Temp.
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 71, 74 (2003); Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza,
Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence From a Community
Sample, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 193, 196 (2004-2005).

35

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

36

Id.

Crime and Unequal Punishment:
Proving Racial Intent in Felony Disenfranchisement

43

of inferiority and the possibility of permanent stigmatizing mentalities.37 This consideration of effects became even more important in
Palmer v. Thompson. The Supreme Court’s opinion discussed the
importance of considering impact over motive, arguing that previous
cases focused on the “actual effects of the enactments,” rather than
“the motive which led states to behave as they did”.38 To the Court,
intent need not be considered on its own because the impacts could
demonstrate whether a law violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The current standard for intent is described in Washington v.
Davis, which established that intent must be discerned by observing the “totality of relevant facts.”39 The Court argued that racial
discrimination must be shown to be a motivating factor behind the
law’s enactment for it to be ruled unconstitutional. Discriminatory intent was further solidified into constitutional law when the
Supreme Court decided that “official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact”.40 There must also be racial motivation behind the law for it
to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.41
Determining this intent can be difficult and problematic. Often,
intent is determined through direct evidence, such as quotes stated
directly by those who create the laws; however, those who create
discriminatory laws are rarely straightforward about such intent,
so explicit evidence is not found often. Thus, the relevant facts for
determining intent include statistics that demonstrate an undeniable
discriminatory impact, the historical background of the decision, the
sequence leading up to the decision, and the legislative history or
statements made by those who created the action.42
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Even with this definition of intent, it is still unclear how exactly
it can be proven, especially because of issues of facial neutrality.
Courts can easily consider only the facts that they view as relevant
when it comes to the entirety of relevant facts, while they fail to consider others that are also relevant. Often, discriminatory impacts and
discriminatory intent are considered separately, as seen in Underwood, rather than considering how impacts may reveal intent. However, it is important to consider how these effects prove intent when
considering all the evidence, particularly when they have been in
place for years. Although impacts are “not the sole touchstone of
invidious racial discrimination,”43 they can demonstrate intent when
the only impacts of a law are discriminatory.
The standard idea of intent is often rudimentary and fails to look
at the totality of factors, focusing arbitrarily on obvious ones, such
as statements made by policymakers and selective enforcement. By
failing to look at the complete picture, discriminatory laws often
stay in place despite racially motivated intent. The Supreme Court
has already established that obvious racial impacts at the start of
a law can clearly demonstrate a racial motivation;44 however, it is
important that courts consider the complete lifespan of these laws,
not only their creation. Lethargic intent is necessary to consider
when observing the history of felony disenfranchisement laws, as it
explains how the actions, or lack thereof, of legislatures in regard to
these laws displays their intent just as much as the facts regarding the
creation of these laws do.

III. Proof of Claim
A. Explicit Intent
Before examining the framework of a more lateral definition of
intent, it remains pertinent to understand the role that explicit discriminatory intent played in the institution of felony disenfranchisement. Just after the Civil War, the criminalization of the newly freed
43

Arlington, 429 U.S. 252 at 253.
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Black population was of the highest priority to the White South,
which relied on slave labor to maintain its economy.45 The Thirteenth Amendment’s slavery exemption for “punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,” allowed the South
to over-criminalize and over-convict Black populations to maintain
its forced-labor economy. Most laws did not specifically target Black
individuals by name, but it was “widely understood that these provisions would rarely if ever be enforced on whites.”46 In fact, eight-five
to ninety percent of those convicted and sentenced to labor were
Black.47 These individuals were then “leased” out as cheap labor to
the very institutions that had enslaved them prior.48 This targeted
criminalization of the Black population would be used in tandem
with felony disenfranchisement laws to erase Black political power
in the following decades.
As mentioned before, felony disenfranchisement laws had been
instituted prior to the Civil War and had historical precedence. However, in the decade following both the enfranchisement of Black
males, felony disenfranchisement laws were expanded in almost
every state.49 This new wave of disenfranchisement provisions
promoted all felonies to disenfranchisement status, while the prior
definitions usually only included robbery and murder.50 This combination of overcriminalization and punitive disenfranchisement
show that felony disenfranchisement’s utility was intentionally
discriminatory.

45

Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery By Another Name: The Re-Enslavement
Of Black People In America From The Civil War To World War II 53
(2008).

46
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47

Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877
205 (2002).

48
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49

Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro
Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 1850-2002, 109 American Journal of Sociology. 559, 597 (2003).

50
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There are cases where explicit intent was both found and considered by the Court. For instance, Mississippi’s legislature altered its
felony disenfranchisement law in 1890 to include only crimes that
the legislature assumed Black men would commit. These crimes
included bigamy, forgery, burglary, arson, and perjury, all of which
were easier to over-criminalize within specific communities.51 It
was only six years later that while upholding these new provisions,
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated the racially discriminatory intent of the law: “restrained by the federal constitution from
discriminating against the negro race, the convention discriminated against its characteristics and the offenses to which its weaker
member were prone.”52 While explicit intent was found in a timely
manner in Mississippi, there are very few cases in which an obvious
timely statement of discriminatory intent can be found. Even when
the Court did recognize explicit intent, felony disenfranchisement
was upheld, making historical context exceedingly important to consider for any felony disenfranchisement challenge.
In the absence of a legislature’s explicit intent, the timing and
placement of these laws can speak to their true intentions. An argument could be made that felony disenfranchisement laws cannot have
discriminatory intent because they are equally applied to all felons.
The historical context is essential for refuting this point. While the
law itself might apply equally across all convicted felons within a
given state, the history of over-criminalizing Black individuals as a
mechanism of disenfranchisement makes felony disenfranchisement
a de facto discriminatory practice. However, we acknowledge that
discriminatory intent is unlikely to be proven by historical context
alone, which is why a more expansive definition of intent is necessary.
B. Lethargic Intent
A more expansive definition of intent would not only consider the
foundational context of the law, but also the totality of facts that
51

Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the
Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537, 540 (1993).

52
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become visible once the law is enforced. This is possible by considering lethargic intent, which is the intent demonstrated by policymakers’ contentment with or defense of a policy. This intent, though
largely based on effects, is not the same as simply considering effects.
It contains an important distinction: it considers whether or not the
law fulfills its stated purpose. Discriminatory side effects alone are
not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but in the absence of
a law’s intended consequences, side effects, when prevalent, become
the primary effects. When laws are upheld and defended for a long
period of time, legislatures are implying that they are content with
the results and that these laws are fulfilling their intended purpose.
Once effects become discernible, legislatures should replace laws
that do not fulfill their purpose with laws that do.
Though legislators do not always follow this principle, there are
instances in which they have changed or repealed laws that had primarily discriminatory impacts. A clear example of this is the Massachusetts 1913 law, which prevented non-residents from getting
married in Massachusetts if their marriage would be invalid in their
home state.53 At the time of enactment, the intent behind the law was
not completely clear, though many have argued that it was to prevent
interracial marriages.54 The law remained in place long after interracial marriages were made legal nationwide, making the intended
purpose defunct. Despite its obsolete purpose, the law continued to
be discriminatory in a way not originally intended by preventing
many same-sex couples from getting married.55 These unintended
discriminatory effects became the driving factor behind the law’s
repeal in 2008.56 The legislature observed the harmful effects of the
law, and rather than continuing to be complacent in them, decided to
53

Mass. Gen. Law, ch. 207, § 11 (1913) (repealed 2008).

54

Zebulon Miletsky, The Dilemma of Interracial Marriage: The Boston
NAACP and the National Equal Rights League, 44 Hist. J. Mass. 136, 139
(2016).

55

Eric Moskowitz, Senate Votes to Repeal 1913 Law, Boston.com, (July
16, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/07/16/senate_votes_to_repeal_1913_law/.
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repeal it. In doing so, they demonstrated that the discriminatory side
effects were not the intended effects of the law.
The standard for discriminatory intent relies on determining
a racial motivation behind the enactment of a law. Lethargic intent
expands upon this by examining the effects of a law years later.
Although this measure focuses on the intent of legislatures long after
the law was created, it can also reveal the motivation behind its creation. The current narrow concept of intent assumes that intent is
always stated intentionally and cannot account for its often-unconscious nature.57 By observing whether legislators are complacent in a
law’s discriminatory effects, courts can determine reasoning behind
its enactment that may be more implicit. Even if policymakers do
not state their racist motivation or even realize they have it, lethargic
intent can reveal this intention by demonstrating contentment with
discriminatory effects while the stated purpose is not fulfilled.
C. Lethargic Intent and Felony Disenfranchisement
Establishing racial intent proves to be a difficult hurdle when challenging felony disenfranchisement. Although disenfranchisement
policies can have a palpable racist stench, they do not often announce
themselves as such. This makes it imperative to outline causal avenues on which racial intent can be proven. Inquiries should focus
upon the role of lethargic intent when challenging felony disenfranchisement provisions.
The most common reasoning behind disenfranchisement laws
is a causal story guided by the following logic: felons have broken
the social contract and have shown that they have poor judgment;
therefore, they should not vote. This intended result has never been
the reality. At its best, this line of thinking is misguided, at its worst,
systemic discrimination. For instance, research has shown that the
effects of increased voting by ex-felons have not been successful in
keeping away incapable voters. Rather, the effects have been impermissibly negative for people of color. For example, a study of felony
57

Sylvia A. Law, Where Do We Go from Here- The Fourteenth Amendment,
Original Intent, and Present Realities, 13 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev.
691, 697-698 (2004).
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disenfranchisement over the years 1850-2002 found obvious racial
impacts of felony disenfranchisement laws. It found that just a ten
percent increase in a state’s nonwhite prison population increased
the odds of passing ex-felon disenfranchisement laws by almost fifty
percent.58 These laws do not only have influence over ex-felons, but
even on Black individuals who have not committed a crime. In states
with lifetime disenfranchisement laws, eligible and registered Black
voters are twelve percent less likely to vote than in states without
those laws, whereas white voters are only one percent less likely.59
This is likely to happen because felony disenfranchisement “exacerbates the bias against low socioeconomic status racial and ethnic
minorities in electoral outcomes and policy responsiveness.”60
Felons can often re-enter society without further incidents,
and research has found that offenders who vote are less likely to
be rearrested than those who do not.61 A 2011 report by the Florida
Parole Commission found that ex-prisoners who did not have their
voting rights restored had recidivism rates of thirty-three percent,
while those who did have their rights restored saw that rate drop to
eleven percent.62 Felony disenfranchisement, rather than a method
of keeping incapable voters away from the voting booths, is a tool
that causes ex-felons to be seen and treated as illegitimate and apart

58

Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro
Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United
States, 1850-2002, 109 American Journal of Sociology. 559, 588 (2003).

59

Melanie Bowers & Robert R. Preuhs, Collateral Consequences of a Collateral Penalty: The Negative Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws
on the Political Participation of Nonfelons, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 722, 739-740
(2009).

60
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61

Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence From a Community Sample, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
193, 196 (2004-2005).

62
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from society.63 Another stated purpose of these disenfranchisement
laws is to deter people from committing felonies; however, there is
no evidence that they act as a deterrent at all.64
As mentioned earlier, the most common reasoning behind felony disenfranchisement policies is a form of protecting the social
contract; these goals are abstract and shield the actual, discriminatory results. This intent should not be permissible in light of extensive racially discriminatory impact. Were these laws to fulfill their
intended purposes of preventing people with poor judgment from
voting and deterring people from crime, the racially disproportionate impacts could possibly be argued to be side effects of these
laws. However, they cannot be considered side effects if they are the
only significant impacts. Since most of these laws extend back to
the 1800s, legislatures can easily observe whether these laws fulfill
their purpose and what their effects have been and continue to be.
Since the purposes are not fulfilled and the effects have a racially
disproportionate impact, legislatures’ inaction in altering these laws
demonstrates their intentional contentment with the harmful effects.
This lethargic intent must be considered when determining the constitutionality of intent under the Equal Protection Clause.

IV. Application to Farrakhan v. Gregoire
In an effort to apply lethargic intent to recent felony disenfranchisement discourse, we will now examine the applicability of lethargic
intent through the case history of Farrakhan v. Gregoire (2010).
Although this case’s contentions center around the Voting Rights
Act, it serves an example of a court attempting to meter different
measures of both discriminatory intent and impact. Farrakhan v.
Gregoire (initially Farrakhan v. Locke) involved a challenge to
Washington State’s felony disenfranchisement laws, specifically if
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said laws violated section two of the federal Voting Rights Act. The
various rulings in this case directly relate to the topic of racial intent
within felony disenfranchisement challenges.
The initial Farrakhan ruling occurred on December 1st, 2000
within the Eastern District of Washington.65 In their decision to
uphold these laws, the court held that the plaintiffs did not prove
that Washington’s felony disenfranchisement laws were “motivated
by racial animus, or that its operation by itself has a discriminatory
effect.”66 The court did not feel as if proper racist impact and intent
were demonstrated, a decision similar to that of Hunter v. Underwood. The three essential rulings in this case are known to those
familiar as Farrakhan I, Farrakhan II, and Farrakhan III.
A. Farrakhan I
The Ninth Circuit later overturned the district ruling on July 25th,
2003.67 This ruling found that racial bias in the criminal justice
system is relevant under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.68 This
decision promotes the use of historical racial analysis in felony disenfranchisement decisions.
B. Farrakhan II
Upon transfer to the Eastern Court of Washington in 2006, and after
denial of review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the second Farrakhan
ruling found “Washington’s history, or lack thereof, of racial bias
in its electoral process and in its decision to enact the felon disenfranchisement provisions, counterbalance the contemporary discriminatory effects that result from the day-to-day functioning of
Washington’s criminal justice system.”69 Farrakhan II’s refutation
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of Farrakhan I’s reasoning demonstrates the legal elasticity when
considering racial impacts and intent in felony disenfranchisement
challenges, further promoting the use of a more expansive measure
of intent.
C. Farrakhan III
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the Eastern Court’s decision and
initially found felony disenfranchisement to violate Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.70 The Ninth Circuit later ordered the case to be
read En Blanc and finds that disenfranchisement laws “predate the
Jim Crow era and, with a few notable exceptions … have not been
adopted based on racial considerations,” and thus the court found
that “felon disenfranchisement laws are categorically exempt from
challenges brought under Section 2 of the VRA.”71
D. Application to Lethargic Intent
Farrakhan v. Gregoire is a clear example of a felony disenfranchisement case that lethargic intent could be effectively applied to. Legal
arguments in defense of felony disenfranchisement usually follow a
similar line of logic to that of Farrakhan III. The court held in Farrakhan III that because most felony disenfranchisement laws were
passed in the far past, we cannot definitively define any specific law
as being passed with racist intent.72 This ruling, even with its questionable logic, strikes at the core of why racial intent is a problematic requirement for challenging felony disenfranchisement and why
lethargic intent is a helpful counter-argument to this line of thinking.
Farrakhan I is an example of a ruling that sides with a more
expansive definition of racial intent and racial impact, specifically
the allowance to view larger historical bias and racism as relevant
when challenging felony disenfranchisement. Lethargic intent takes
this more expanded view and applies it directly to the logic seen in
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Farrakhan III. Even if the court’s logic in Farrakhan III held true,
that initial intent was not discriminatory, lethargic intent would
still be a viable pathway for challenging felony disenfranchisement.
Within the lethargic intent framework, the initial authors’ intent is
considered but does not ultimately decide the intent of the policy.
Rather, as the policy ages, and discriminatory effects reveal themselves, the intent now falls upon the current agents of the law (i.e.,
the legislature). If the receiving agents of intent do not alter a law
when its discriminatory effects are clear, this racially discriminatory
intent is then assumed. An expanded definition of intent is necessary
in the light of issues like racism, in which those who enact racially
discriminatory laws often do so without indicating their racist intent,
or without realizing it themselves.

V. Conclusion
The intent qualification for determining the constitutionality of
felony disenfranchisement should be determined by analyzing the
totality of facts. This analysis should include lethargic intent, or the
intent established by the lack of action by legislatures after these
laws are in place. When legislatures’ inaction allows discriminatory
impacts to persist, they demonstrate their support for these unintended effects and thus illustrate their intent for these laws to be
continually discriminatory.
This does not mean that all felony disenfranchisement laws are
to be immediately removed. Instead, these laws should be faced with
this expanded definition of intent when they are challenged in courts.
When held under the test of lethargic intent, it is unlikely that these
laws will be held constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, legislatures themselves
should reflect upon the discriminatory impact of felony disenfranchisement laws and examine their own lethargic intent while upholding these laws.
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